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CLUSTER VII
IDENTITY MATTERS
Sharon E. Rush*
INTRODUCTION
As I read this cluster of papers on race, gender and sexuality, I
am reminded of the caterpillar in Alice in Wonderland.1 When Alice
comes upon him as he rests on a mushroom, he blows smoke from his
hookah that, in the movie version, spells out the question he simul-
taneously asks her, "W h o a r e y o u?" The smokey, blurry letters
float in the air and gradually fade into oblivion while Alice thinks
about the question.' Obviously, the caterpillar wants to know Alice's
name and perhaps what her business is in Wonderland, "his" world.4
But he also is asking Alice a much harder question: Who is she fun-
damentally? The question confuses Alice because she knew who she
was before arriving in Wonderland, but a number of curious events
have disoriented and confused her about many things, including her
identity.
Authors Beverly Greene, Joe Feagin, Felipe Lopez, Josephine
Ross and Ofelia Schutte ask variations of the caterpillar's question:
Who should decide one's fundamental identity?' Is identity a matter
* Irving Cypen Professor, Co-founder Center for the Study of Race and Race Re-
lations, Associate Director of the Center for Children and the Law, University of Flor-
ida Levin College of Law. Copyright 2002. I want to thank participants of the LatCrit
VI Conference at the University of Florida in December 2001 for their insightful pa-
pers and the participants at the Conference on Children and Education at Cornell
University in April 2002 where parts of this essay were presented. Berta Hernandez-
Truyol, being the wonderful colleague she is, read and commented on an earlier draft
and I thank her. This essay builds on a larger article, Emotional Segregation, 36 U.
MICH. J. LAW REFORM (2003) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Rush, Emotional Segrega-
tion].
1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLASS 40-41 (Roger Lancelyn Green, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1971) (1865).
2. ALICE IN WONDERLAND (Walt Disney 1951).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See generally Joe R. Feagin, White Supremacy and Mexican Americans: Re-
thinking the "Black-White Paradigm," 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 959 (2002); Beverly Greene,
Heterosexism and Internalized Racism Among African Americans: The Connections
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of self-definition or is it a matter of other imposed-definition? The au-
thors explore the tension between these possibilities and expose how
hegemonic power structures impose negative identities on members
of minority groups to strip them of their power to identify themselves
in ways that are socially or legally acceptable. Specifically, in Riddle
for Our Times: The Continued Refusal to Apply the Miscegenation
Analogy to Same-Sex Marriage, Ross explores the connections be-
tween society's need to sexualize interracial marriages and same-
gender marriages for the purpose of identifying those relationships
as inferior because they lack mutual love, loyalty, trust, and respect -
emotions that automatically are presumed to exist in same-race and
different-gender marital relationships.'
Closely related, Feagin's essay, White Supremacy and Mexican
Americans: Rethinking the "Black-White Paradigm," and Lopez's es-
say, The Construction of Mexican Identity, analyze the need for
dominant races to define minority races as "inferior" in order to
maintain racial supremacy.7 Feagin lays out some of the history es-
tablishing White society's control over the racializing of others, in-
cluding its power to define where racial groups fit into a hierarchy
with Whites at the top and Blacks at the bottom.' Lopez's paper, in
some ways, exemplifies Feagin's point: the primary reason indige-
nous people are pressured to identify as Mestizo and not Indian is
because a 'Mexican identity" is perceived by the dominant culture to
be more valuable if it is closer to being White than to being Black.' In
Heterosexism and Internalized Racism Among African Americans:
The Connections and Considerations for African American Lesbians
and Bisexual Women, Greene makes a similar point but in a different
context."° While Lopez focuses on indigenous people resisting the
identity of racial and cultural inferior because they are not Mestizo
or White," Greene focuses on gays, lesbians, and bisexuals resisting
the identity of sexual deviate because they are not heterosexual. 2 Fi-
nally, in her essay, Indigenous Issues and the Ethics of Dialogue in
Lat Crit Theory, Schutte reminds us that dominant groups have ethi-
and Considerations for African Americans Lesbians and Bisexual Women: A Clinical
Psychological Perspective, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 931 (2002); Felipe H. Lopez, The Con-
struction of Mexican Identity, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 989 (2002); Josephine Ross, Riddle
for Our Times: The Continued Refusal to Apply the Miscegenation Analogy to Same-Sex
Marriage, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 999 (2002); Ofelia Schutte, Indigenous Issues and the
Ethics of Dialogue in LatCrit Theory, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1021 (2002).
6. Ross, supra note 5, at 999-1002.
7. See generally Feagin, supra note 5, at 959-982; Lopez, supra note 5, at 989-997.
8. Feagin, supra note 5, at 959-962.
9. Lopez, supra note 5, at 990-991.
10. Greene, supra note 5, at 932.
11. Lopez, supra note 5, at 995-96.
12. Greene, supra note 5, at 932.
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cal and moral obligations not to impose liberation paradigms on in-
digenous people because such imposition is yet another way to strip
people of their power to self-identify.13
Thus, all of the authors explore the dominant culture's ability to
impose identities on sexual and/or racial minorities by inducing them
to reject their self-imposed fundamental identities. This is one way to
"motivate" minorities to deny who they are and to conform to the
dominant culture's normative classification of who they should be.
Significantly, the authors understand the importance of individuals
resisting imposed identities, while also acknowledging the difficulties
in exposing how other-imposed identification on marginalized groups
often is not understood by the groups themselves. The caterpillar's
question can create self-doubt in anyone who threatens the status
quo in Wonderland.14 Indeed, as the authors stress, a powerful way to
undermine a person's self-esteem is to create self-doubt or even self-
hatred in the person based on the person's fundamental identity.
Degrading minorities because they are who they are is only part
of the hegemony paradigm because dominant cultures can identify
some groups as inferior only by identifying themselves as superior.'"
Accordingly, dominant group members also must have identities im-
posed on them for hegemony to persist and function. While most
dominant group members accept and embrace their imposed superior
status,'6 inequality is maintained from generation to generation by
indoctrinating young children in the lessons of inferiority/superiority
precepts. I remember a middle-aged Black woman's expression of this
at a conference. She said, "I remember the pain on my mother's face
and I am sure my children see it on mine."" Indeed, most young chil-
dren are too intellectually and emotionally immature to resist the
initial indoctrination. Instead, children identified as "superior" hap-
pily embrace the lesson and children who are identified as "inferior"
struggle to resist it and, sadly, some internalize it.
The problem is enormous because dominant cultures largely con-
13. Schutte, supra note 5, at 1022.
14. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 40.
15. Professor Adrienne Davis calls this the problem of the "mythic double-headed
hydra," suggesting that inequality has both a subordination element as well as a privi-
lege element. Davis asserts, "[D]iscrimination cannot be ended by focusing only on
subordination." Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence:
Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE
573, 577 (Richard Delgado, ed. 1995).
16. But see Interview with Noel Ignatiev, Treason to Whiteness Is Loyalty to Hu-
manity, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 607, 607 (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) (arguing that whites who become "race traitors"
jeopardize their "ability to draw upon the privileges of the white skin").
17. SHARON E. RUSH, LOVING ACROSS THE COLOR LINE: A WHITE ADOPTIVE
MOTHER LEARNS ABOUT RACE 7 (2000) [hereinafter RUSH, LOVING].
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trol children's education and impose identities on all of them. This is
not unique to the United States and is, in fact, a universal problem
as Schutte and Lopez highlight."8 In describing the marginalization of
indigenous people in Mexico, Lopez states, "Education has long been
used as a means by which identity is constructed.... [c]hildren are
taught that '[t]he Mestizo is the symbol of Mexican nationalism.". 9
Increasingly, dominant cultures that purportedly support the
equality of all people nevertheless define equality in ways that pro-
mote their privileged status. For example, under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, "equal protection" seems to mean "process equality," requiring
that all people be treated the same regardless of differences in their
fundamental identities. ° This precludes the possibility of judicially
protecting minorities' right to self-identify in legally meaningful ways
unless the dominant culture supports their legal equality through
legislation. By wielding their political power to control whether mi-
norities will be treated equally, dominant cultures attempt to "moti-
vate" minorities to conform to dominant norms if they want to be
equal. A process definition of equality not only devalues the identities
of minorities, it further exalts the identities of majorities under the
guise of treating everyone equally.
My work focuses on racial equality and this essay explores race
to better understand how children are taught the race precept - the
myth of White superiority and Black inferiority." Using Frank Val-
des' concept of "rotating centers"" and Trina Grillo and Stephanie
Wildman's concept of "recognition time," my focus on Black/White
18. Lopez, supra note 5, at 995; Schutte, supra note 5, at 1026-27.
19. Lopez, supra note 5, at 994 (quoting BARBARA LUISE MARGOLIES, PRINCES OF
THE EARTH: SUBCULTURE DIVERSITY IN A MEXICAN MUNICIPALITY 140 (1975)).
20. This difference is at the center of the debate about what "equal protection"
means. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 10.11 at 887-89 (2d. ed. 2002) (observing that "rational" wealth discrimina-
tion often masks irrational race discrimination).
21. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 9 (1996) ("[Tlhe precept of inferior-
ity... posed as an article of faith that African Americans were not quite altogether
human.").
22. Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32
CONN. L. REV. 1, 10 n.18 (1999) (citing Videotape: Frank Valdes, Remarks at the Con-
fronting Race Conference, Univ. of Florida Center for the Study of Race and Race Rela-
tions (Feb. 20-21, 1998) (on file with the Univ. of Florida College of Law Media Cen-
ter)) [hereinafter Rush, Sharing Space]. Rush interprets Valdes's remarks to suggest
scholars can "focus on one type of oppression at a time without diminishing the impor-
tance of focusing on other types of oppression." Id.
23. Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The.
Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other Isms), in
PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 85, 99
(Stephanie M. Wildman ed., 1996) ("Recognition time acknowledges both the need to
[Vol. 54:909
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relationships is not meant to detract from the importance of other
types of oppression or to suggest that the "Black/White paradigm" is
the only important critical analysis in the study of race.24 Rather, by
sharing my experiences as a White mother of a Black child, I hope to
offer insights that also apply to other forms of discrimination. Par-
ticularly, lessons about inferiority/superiority precepts can be studied
in many contexts in addition to race, including sex and sexual orien-
tation, the focus of the articles by Greene and Ross.2" Moreover, many
individuals have multiple fundamental identity traits, highlighting
the complexities of any exploration about identity. Greene's analysis
of African American lesbians and bisexuals highlights this concept of
multiple identities. 6 Accordingly, many of the principles in the fol-
lowing analysis of racial equality may be useful to understand other
hegemonic power structures.
EDUCATING CHILDREN IN THE RACE PRECEPT
De terminate Segregation
The United States is in an era somewhere between de jure and
de facto segregation, an era I call de terminate segregation: White so-
ciety is determined to keep America racially segregated. White peo-
ple of goodwill, those who identify themselves as antiracist, do not
want to return to de jure segregation, but de facto segregation is gen-
erally unproblematic to them. Moreover, they also seem increasingly
unwilling to share public space with people of color. 7 Perhaps this is
not surprising, especially if one focuses on Justice Harlan's dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson,"5 in which he stated that "[o]ur Constitution is
color-blind." 9 Frequently omitted from discussions of Harlan's dis-
sent is the following passage:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth,
honor the pain of those oppressed by other isms, each in their turn, and the need to
allow the oppression being focused on to remain center stage.") [hereinafter PRIVILEGE
REVEALED].
24. See e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Black/ White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Nor-
mal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997), 10 LA RAZA
L.J. 127 (1998) (suggesting the focus on the Black/White paradigm marginalizes other
racial groups); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Borders (En)gendered: Normativi-
ties, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882 (1997) (discussing the
need for Latino/a race theories).
25. See Greene, supra note 5; Ross, supra note 5.
26. See Greene, supra note 5.
27. See generally Rush, Sharing Space, supra note 22, at 52 (discussing the need
for society's proactive equalization of racial imbalance).
28. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
29. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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and in power. So, I doubt not that it will continue to be for all time,
if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the princi-
ples of constitutional liberty.3"
As Alice might say, it gets "'[c]uriouser and curiouser"31 : How
can the Constitution be color-blind and yet Whites be and remain the
dominant race?
Harlan might be suggesting that Blacks are inherently inferior
to Whites and Whites are inherently superior to Blacks. This would
be an explicit rendition of the race precept and given that Harlan
dissented in Plessy, undoubtedly an unpopular position, it seems
unlikely that he believed in the inherent inferiority of Blacks or su-
periority of Whites. Alternatively, Harlan might be suggesting that
Blacks are so far behind in social and legal equality that they can
never catch up to Whites. While not as explicit, this also is an ex-
pression of the race precept because this view evidences Harlan's be-
lief that Blacks do not deserve to be equal to Whites or, presumably,
White society would do something to create racial equality. This posi-
tion seems particularly compelling given that Blacks' inequality re-
sulted directly from White society's institutions of slavery and Jim
Crow.3" Regardless of how one interprets Harlan's message, then, ra-
cial inequality will persist because Whites believe they are entitled to
be the dominant race.
Over a century has passed since Harlan's dissent and thus far,
he has been right; Whites continue to be the dominant race because
on some level of consciousness, Whites believe their fundamental
identity as a race includes being superior to all other races. More-
over, the validity of the race precept is a primary lesson children are
taught by adults, including public school teachers. Race precept les-
sons usually are not consciously taught by public school teachers, be-
cause Whites of goodwill, by definition, express their belief in racial
equality. However, most Whites of goodwill have yet to renounce the
White superiority-half of the race precept because they continue to
believe in it. Realize what this means: as long as Whites believe in
their racial superiority, then they also must believe in the inferiority
of people of color. One can only be "superior" if someone else is "infe-
rior." Like a horse and carriage, superiority and inferiority go to-
gether.
If Harlan is correct, America is in a perpetual state of racial ine-
30. Id.
31. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 16.
32. See RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES To BLACKS (2000)
(presenting the case for reparations for slavery, de jure segregation, and persistent de
facto segregation); see also JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALI-
TIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 260-66 (2000) (outlining the arguments for and
against restitution and reparations, along with specific proposals).
[Vol. 54:909
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quality with the contours established by the Black/White paradigm
explored by Feagin."3 Whites constructed the paradigm to place them-
selves at the top, Blacks at the bottom, and other racial groups
somewhere in between. 4 Despite Harlan's admonition that the
United States is a color-blind nation, not only will color-blindness not
equalize the races, but no legal rules will promote racial equality as
long as Whites insist on being the dominant race. This is de termi-
nate segregation: White society is determined to keep society racially
segregated as a principle of constitutional equality because their
fundamental identity is linked to the race precept.
A dominant culture that purportedly believes in the equality of
all people but does relatively little to achieve it is challenged to de-
vise and justify procedures that look like they promote equality but
which actually maintain the status quo of inequality. In the United
States, White society has been able to meet this challenge by adopt-
ing the process definition of equality," thereby legally ensuring racial
inequality, including involuntary racial segregation in many public
spaces. For example, requiring race blind admissions in public uni-
versities is a form of de terminate segregation. States that eliminated
race conscious processes in their public university admissions saw
enrollment of Blacks drop36 and consequently, decided to engage in
intense efforts to regain the racial diversity those processes brought.
For example, California's Proposition 209"7 prohibits the considera-
tion of race in admissions38 and university officials have since imple-
mented race blind processes designed to maintain racial diversity.
These policies entail automatically accepting the top four percent of
33. See Feagin, supra note 5, at 965-67.
34. Id. at 968 ("Each new immigrant group is usually placed by dominant whites
somewhere in the white-to-black hierarchy of wealth and power, as well as in the cor-
responding white-to-black status continuum.").
35. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Pro-
tection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005-16 (1986) (distinguishing between process equal-
ity (anti-differentiation theory of equality) and result equality (anti-subordination the-
ory of equality)).
36. See Rush, Sharing Spaces, supra note 22, at 53. For example, the University of
California admitted 8,000 students to Berkeley in 2002, including 191 Blacks, which
was down from 562 the previous year. Id. (footnotes omitted). Berkeley accepted 852
Latino/Latina students, down from 1,411 in 2001. Id. UCLA saw similar drops. In
2002, it accepted 11,000 students, including 280 Blacks, down from 488 in 2001, and
1,001 Latino/Latina, down from 1,497. Id. For a more detailed discussion on the effects
of the elimination of affirmative action in California, see generally Charles R. Law-
rence, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 928 (2001).
37. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31 (West 2002) (effective Nov. 5, 1996 and known as
Proposition 209).
38. Id. ("The State shall not... grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin .. ")
2002]
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graduating high school classes, increasing scholarship money based
on need, spending "[h]undreds of millions of dollars ... on improving
public schools in low-income neighborhoods," and actively recruiting
students from neighborhoods that typically would not have applied to
the university.39 More recent figures show that racial minority en-
rollment in California universities is getting back to previous levels.40
Nevertheless, racial minority students' admission to California's two
most elite state universities remains lower than it was prior to
Proposition 209.41
The Supreme Court's latest ruling on the question of whether
race can be a factor in admissions is Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke, 42 in which the Court allowed the practice, but failed
to agree on the correct standard of review to apply to affirmative ac-
tion policies.43 Since Bakke, the Court has held that strict scrutiny
must be applied to all racial classifications, 4 but has not decided
whether affirmative action policies can meet this standard.4" Interest-
ingly and significantly, however, in United States v. Virginia,46 in
which the Virginia Military Institute's male-only admission policy
was struck down, all eight Justices47 presiding in the case agreed that
39. Clarence Page, Don't Jeopardize Progress in Racial Enrollment Trends, SEAT-
TLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 16, 2002, at B4. Page notes that Black, Hispanic, and
Native American students made up 18.6% of freshman in California's ten state univer-
sities in 1997, compared to 17.6% the year before and 18.8% the year before Proposi-
tion 209 implemented. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
43. See id. at 324-35 (4-4-1 decision) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). For a detailed discussion of the different rationales, see Rush, Sharing Space,
supra note 22, at 61, n.215.
44. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995).
45. Lower federal courts are split on the question of whether admissions policies to
public schools must be race blind or whether those policies survive strict scrutiny
when they further the state's interest in racial diversity. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas,
78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding "that any consideration of race or ethnic-
ity ... for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment"); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188,
1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that educational diversity is a compelling interest), cert
denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001). The Sixth Circuit consolidated two cases on appeal be-
cause of the divergent opinions of the two district court judges. See Grutter v. Bollin-
ger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (consolidating Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d
821, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding diversity is not a compelling interest) and Gratz v.
Bollinger, 122 F. Supp 2d 811, 821-22 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding diversity is a compel-
ling interest)), cert. granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Aug. 16, 2002) (No. 02-241). The
Sixth Circuit reversed Grutter but postponed decision in Gratz. Grutter, 288 F.3d at
735 n.2.
46. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
47. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection, 6
[Vol. 54:909
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diversity in higher education is a valid state interest.48 Presumably, if
gender diversity is a constitutionally acceptable state interest, then
racial diversity should be also. One is left to ask: why would a society
that purportedly believes in racial equality adopt laws that prohibit
race from being a factor in higher education admissions, especially
given that (1) the Supreme Court stated in Bakke that universities
can do this,49 (2) the current Court has not stated such a policy would
fail strict scrutiny, and (3) the current Court overwhelmingly sup-
ports diversity in higher education?"
Certainly, the intense efforts by officials in California and other
states to regain and maintain racial diversity levels after adopting
race blind admissions procedures indicate that most states agree that
racial diversity is important in higher education. The challenge is to
figure out how public universities can achieve both diversity and
equality, concepts which most people think are synonymous, or, at
least, inextricably intertwined.5' Operating on a premature assump-
tion that race conscious admissions policies are unconstitutional un-
der equal protection, racial diversity nevertheless is important
enough to California officials that they "use class and geography as
proxies for race and ethnicity." 2 Whether these policies also violate
equal protection is an open question. If proxies are unlawful, then
laws mandating race blind admissions policies are consistent with de
terminate segregation because the law will have made it even more
difficult to achieve racial diversity in education, a valid constitutional
goal.
The most important point in this debate, however, is obscured by
the diversity question. A school without racial diversity is a segre-
gated school, not because of a Plessy-type legal mandate or de facto
segregation post-Brown (efforts that were somewhat successful in in-
tegrating schools). Rather, the resegregation of public universities, to
a large extent, is due to a legal mandate that requires admissions
policies to be race blind." The result of such policies is de terminate
AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 43, 45 n.9 (1997) (noting that Justice Thomas recused himself
because his son was attending Virginia Military Institute at the time of the suit) [here-
inafter Rush, Diversity].
48. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 565; see also Rush, Diversity, supra note 47, at 53-56.
49. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272.
50. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
51. I have always thought that diversity and equality are necessarily intertwined,
but also separate concepts, and that diversity functions to divert attention away from
the real issue of equality. Racial diversity is necessary to have racial equality, but di-
versity can be defined so broadly that racial equality drops out of focus. See Rush, Di-
versity, supra note 47, at 53 (discussing how the Bakke Court's definition of diversity
was too broad).
52. Page, supra note 39, at B4.
53. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
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segregation. Racially segregated public schools violate Brown's hold-
ing that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."54
In this way, race blind admissions policies almost guarantee that ra-
cial inequality in education will persist, even though the rhetoric of
diversity drowns out this reality. By shifting the focus to "diversity,"
White society successfully skirts the issue of equality. -
If racial diversity can be achieved indirectly through race blind
efforts, and this has yet to be seen, then de terminate segregation will
be temporary and one might question what really has been gained by
enacting laws like Proposition 209 or by (prematurely) interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent race from being considered as
a factor in higher education admissions. Quite significantly, by ex-
plicitly prohibiting race conscious admissions policies, the dominant
culture maintains its power to define equality as process. Its race
blind policies, at a minimum, temporarily segregate public universi-
ties and send officials scrambling for legal ways to "diversify" (re-
integrate) them. In this way, the importance of racial equality can be
manipulated to fit an understanding of equality that maintains the
dominant group's superior identity.
Moreover, minorities who support color blind admissions are
persuaded by the dominant culture's argument that race is tied to
merit and that if race is allowed to be a factor in public school admis-
sions, then people will think students are admitted only because of
their race and that they are not really qualified. Minorities who sup-
port this view would rather avoid the stigma attached to race con-
scious policies. Their support "seals the deal," because the small per-
centage of minorities who espouse this view, in turn, provide the nec-
essary evidence for Whites to justify their support for color blind poli-
cies. "Why should Whites support race conscious admission policies if
people of color do not want them?" Whites ask.
In the end, a race blind admissions procedure produces a legal
and social norm that the identities of racial and ethnic minorities are
unimportant except to show the validity of the race precept. That is,
race blind policies presume that Blacks can only gain admission to
top public universities if their race is a factor, and similarly, the rea-
son they are denied admission is because race was not a factor. Ei-
ther way, their racial identity drives the admissions process because
their racial identities are explicitly linked to White society's belief in
the race precept, including its conscious or unconscious belief in
White superiority. De terminate segregation is not as explicitly mali-
cious as de jure segregation, but both are premised on the race pre-
cept.
54. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), supplemented by
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
[Vol. 54:909
CLUSTER 7 INTRODUCTION
De terminate segregation also occurs within schools. Academic
tracking policies that place children in educational groups depending
on their "intellectual" abilities are forms of de terminate segregation.
For example, in 1992 Blacks made up sixteen percent of public school
students, but represented nearly forty percent of those in "special"
education classes - classes for mentally disabled or students with
other special needs.5 "African American children nationwide are
nearly three times as likely as White students to be labeled mentally
retarded."56 In 1992, White students were twice as likely to be
tracked as gifted than are Black students. 7 De terminate segregation
is also evident in school disciplinary systems. A 1992 study revealed
that a Black child was nearly three times more likely to be sus-
pended compared to a White child. 8
Race blind admission, tracking, and disciplinary policies that re-
sult in the physical racial segregation of children are not unconstitu-
tional. Logically, to establish that students can be emotionally segre-
gated in public education in violation of equality principles presents
an even bigger challenge. Nevertheless, exploring this possibility is
worthwhile because it is another way dominant society undermines
minorities' fundamental identities and creates de terminate segrega-
tion.
Emotional Segregation
Beginning at early ages, children are indoctrinated in a variety
of inequality precepts that situate them on a hierarchy. Teaching
children to believe in the validity of inequality precepts creates what
I call "emotional segregation," which is the societal sanctioning of
disrespect for people in ways that violate democratic principles such
as equality. 9 Children learn inequality precepts from adults
throughout society, and the problem is particularly troubling in pub-
lic schools, the focus of my comments. Again, this analysis can be ap-
plied to any hegemonic power structure because they all function on
an inequality precept in which the dominant group self-identifies as
55. ANDREW HACKER, TwO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UN-
EQUAL 164 (1992); see also Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of
a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1251-56 (1995) (observing that black chil-
dren are more likely than children of other races to be targeted for "special education"
programs, but are rarely targeted for "gifted" programs).
56. Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in our Public
Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special
Education Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 412 (2001)
(suggesting that the overrepresentation of minorities in special education classes re-
duces their educational opportunities).
57. See Glennon, supra note 55, at 1256.
58. Id. at 1255.
59. See generally Rush, Emotional Segregation, supra note *
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"superior" and also imposes an "inferior" identity on disfavored
groups.
For purposes of this essay, "emotional segregation" is sanctioned
disrespect by public school teachers of racial minority students. Cre-
ating emotional segregation by teaching children the validity of the
race precept is one way teachers impose inferior/superior racial iden-
tities on all children. Significantly, teachers can impart this lesson in
integrated or segregated classrooms because the lesson originated in
slavery and was reiterated during Jim Crow and the days of segrega-
tion. As the Brown Court observed, the lesson "of inferiority as to
[Blacks'] status in the community... may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." °
As the White mother of a Black child, I have become increasingly
aware of the existence of emotional segregation in public schools in
the context of race. I want to use The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn
by Mark Twain61 to explore briefly what emotional segregation is and
how it functions as a process definition of equality that imposes iden-
tifications on both racial minority and majority students. Again, it is
important to understand and remember that all children are exposed
to lessons from dominant cultures about what their fundamental
identities are.
Huck Finn is one of the most assigned books in schools, second
only to Shakespeare.62 It also is one of the most racially divisive books
in public school curricula. Blacks want it out of the curriculum be-
cause it teaches the validity of the race precept,63 and Whites want it
in the curriculum because they value it as an antiracist classic. 4
Huck Finn is a good vehicle for exploring the concept of emotional
segregation as a form of de terminate segregation because the rela-
tionship White society has and wants to maintain with Blacks and
people of color generally, mirrors the relationship Huck has with
Jim.
At first glance, perhaps this assessment is an acceptable asser-
60. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
61. MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (Oxford Univ. Press 1996)
(1885).
62. ELAIN MENSH & HARRY MENSH, BLACK, WHITE, AND HUCKLEBERRY FINN: RE-
IMAGINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 12 (2000) (citing Arthur Applebee, Stability and
Change in the High School Canon, 81 ENGLISH JOURNAL 28 (1992)).
63. See generally SATIRE OR EVASION? BLACK PERSPECTIVES ON HUCKLEBERRY
FINN (James S. Leonard et al. eds., 1992) (offering essays by African American schol-
ars who support and reject Huck Finn) [hereinafter SATIRE OR EVASION?].
64. Sharon E. Rush, The Anticanonical Lesson of Huckleberry Finn, 11 CORNELL J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (2002) (forthcoming) (positing that the novel should be placed in
an anticanon of American literature where it is available for voluntary readers) [here-
inafter Rush, Huck Finn].
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tion because one reason Huck Finn is held out as an antiracist classic
is because many, if not most, Whites believe Huck comes to love
Jim." Under this view, teachers can justify including the book in
their curricula for young students, such as middle- and high-school
students, because it teaches them to value interracial friendships.
This lesson addresses concerns raised by Ross, who analogizes the
societal hatred of same-gender marriages to the historical and persis-
tent societal hatred of interracial marriages.66 If children can be
taught to respect interracial relationships, then perhaps similar rea-
soning can be applied to same-gender relationships to promote
greater equality in both areas. In turn, this empowers people in those
relationships to reclaim their fundamental identities.
On closer reflection, however, Huck and Jim's relationship is not
an example of what a loving interracial relationship is or should be
because Huck does not love Jim. It is not even a close call. Huck does
not love Jim for a variety of reasons, 7 but the reason I want to focus
on is the emotion of "respect," which means "to feel or show honor
for." 8 Professor Jonathan Cohen writes about the internal and exter-
nal aspects of respect, meaning that one can feel respect for someone
and one also can show respect for someone.69 I posit that Huck disre-
spects Jim because Huck does not feel or show respect for Jim.
This lack of respect is evidenced by one of the most objectionable
aspects of the novel, Twain's use of the racial epithet, the "n-word,"
approximately 210 times.70 The epithet is used by Whites to identify
themselves as superior to Blacks, who then become identified as infe-
rior. Moreover, the racial epithet is the vilest form of identification.
Consider its use in three different contexts.
The O.J. Simpson Trial7
White people of goodwill understand that the epithet is offensive
and that saying it marks a person a racist. Professor Arac offers a
poignant example." In O.J. Simpson's trial for the murder of his wife,
65. See, e.g., Peaches Henry, The Struggle for Tolerance: Race and Censorship in
Huckleberry Finn, in SATIRE OR EvASION?, supra note 63, 25, 36 (stating that the rela-
tionship between Huck and Jim is seen by some as father/son).
66. See Ross, supra note 5, at 1000-02.
67. See generally Rush, Huck Finn, supra note 64 (exploring the issues of trust and
empathy in Huck and Jim's relationship as well as the issue of respect).
68. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD STUDENT'S DICTIONARY 758 (1996).
69. Jonathan R. Cohen, When People are the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 753-54 (2001).
70. JONATHAN ARAC, HUCKLEBERRY FINN AS IDOL AND TARGET 20 (1997).
71. This part of the essay is taken from my longer piece, Emotional Segregation.
See generally Rush, Emotional Segregation, supra note *
72. ARAC, supra note 70, at 29.
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Nicole, and her friend, Ronald Goldman, African American defense
counsel Johnnie Cochran wanted to demonstrate witness Detective
Mark Fuhrman's racism toward Blacks, including Simpson. Coch-
ran's theory was that Fuhrman fabricated evidence to ensure Simp-
son's conviction, and Cochran's best evidence of Fuhrman's racism
was his use of the epithet in a film made years before the Simpson
trial.73 In an effort to keep the jury, comprised mostly of Blacks, from
hearing this evidence, prosecutor Christopher Darden, also African
American, argued that:
"[the epithet] was so hideously pejorative that it would inevitably
prejudice the mostly black jury ... It's the filthiest, dirtiest, nasti-
est word in the English language, so powerful that 'when you men-
tion that word to this jury, or any African-American, it blinds peo-
ple. It'll blind the jury. It'll blind the truth. They won't be able to
discern what's true and what's not.' 74
Cochran responded that African Americans "bear so much that
they can bear this too and keep their 'perspective': 'African Ameri-
cans live with offensive words, offensive looks, offensive treatment
every day of their lives."'"
Judge Ito ruled in favor of admitting the evidence, with this cau-
tion to the jury: "[the epithet] is so vile that it operates as a divisive
demand that those to whom or about whom it is said take some ac-
tion and that its use can cloud the operation of good judgment and
common sense.
6
This excerpt raises three interesting points. First, Darden, Coch-
ran, and Ito agreed that the word was extremely pejorative and con-
sidered whether it would be potentially destructive of the truth-
finding mission of the trial.77 Second, it seemed to be a given that if
Fuhrman had used the racial epithet, then he was racist and proba-
bly was motivated to fabricate incriminating evidence against Simp-
son. At a minimum, the jury would have had reasonable doubt to
question Fuhrman's integrity in conducting the investigation of the
crime scene. Finally, Fuhrman's use of the word was not directed at
Simpson or at any other African American in the courtroom, but eve-
ryone seemed to agree that merely uttering the word could do serious
collateral damage to all the African Americans who would hear it, in-
cluding the jurors, Simpson, Darden, and Cochran.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
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The Nursery School'
Carla is a three-year-old biracial (White/White-Asian) child who
attempts to move her cot during nap time because she cannot sleep
next to four-year-old Nicole, who is Black. When asked why by the
teacher, Carla replies, "Because I can't sleep next to a... [n-- -]...
[N's] are stinky. I can't sleep next to one.'' The teacher does not ac-
cept this explanation from Carla, and insists she keep her cot next to
Nicole. The teacher reported the incident to the director of the nurs-
ery school, who convened a meeting at which eight adults were pre-
sent, including Carla's parents, several teachers, and an educational
psychologist."
When Carla's parents learned what had happened, they could
not believe it." They quickly emphasized that they did not teach their
daughter the word, and the teacher quickly defended the nursery
school staff. 2 The adults remained puzzled as to who taught Carla
the racial epithet until Carla's father figured it out.83 He deduced
that Carla learned the word from a nursery schoolmate, who learned
it from her dad.84 Carla's father was convinced this was the source of
the lesson because the "other" father was a "redneck" in Carla's fa-
ther's eyes.8"
The use of "redneck" silenced the other seven adults at the meet-
ing and after a few moments, the director announced the real source
of Carla's racial epithet lesson, "It's amazing what kids will pick up
in the neighborhood." 6 Relieved, the adults decided the appropriate
response to the situation was to teach Carla to "unlearn" the epithet
and make sure the other children did not learn it.87
The Public School Classroom
Compare the serious consideration given to the introduction of
the word in Simpson's trial and the serious concern given to Carla's
use of it in the nursery school with the facile acceptance of its re-
peated use in Huck Finn. Realize that all of those involved in the de-
cision whether to allow Fuhrman's testimony were adults. Moreover,
78. This example is taken from DEBRA VAN AUSDALE & JOE FEAGIN, THE FIRST R:
How CHILDREN LEARN RACE AND RACISM 97-98 (2001).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 99.
87. Id.
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invocation of the epithet in the trial setting was for a limited purpose
in a controlled environment. In stark contrast, it is children, usually
between the ages of eleven and seventeen, who are subjected to the
repeated use of the epithet in reading Huck Finn. Children and
young adults are far less able to contextualize use of the epithet or
control their emotional responses to it. The harm to children inflicted
with racial pain is greater than it is for adults,88 and logically, the
impact of the epithet on them deserves as much, if not more, consid-
eration than the impact on the adults in the Simpson trial.
Moreover, all the adults in the nursery school agreed that Carla
needed to be taught not to use the word. 9 Adults who tell children
not to use the word because it is uniquely harmful and who then
support its repeated use in a novel held out as an antiracist classic
send confusing messages to children. This is not a way to "unlearn"
the word, and some children interpret the mixed message as a license
to use it." Intellectually and emotionally immature students learn
that it is acceptable to use the word sometimes, which is a lesson in
the validity of the race precept.
Huck's disrespect for Jim and Blacks extends beyond the epithet.
Another troubling message many children learn from the novel is
that White children are superior to Blacks because Huck's dilemma
whether to see Jim as a human being or a piece of property is pre-
sented as a real moral dilemma. But is it? If Huck believed that
White society thought that slavery was moral, then his dilemma was
whether he should abide by a moral law or break the law and par-
ticipate in a robbery by concealing Miss Watson's "property" from
her. The whole point of the book, however, is to show Huck's moral
development. Twain wants the reader to believe that Huck comes to
the conclusion that it is justifiable to break the law because Jim is a
human being and to enslave him is immoral. However, the choice
whether to treat an individual as a human being or as a piece of
property was not a moral dilemma because Whites knew slavery was
immoral but tried to justify it on economic and political grounds.9 If
Huck understood that even White society knew that slavery was im-
moral, then his dilemma did not turn on his rebellion against society.
Rather, Huck's dilemma turned on choosing between violating or fol-
88. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 15, at 162 (stating that ra-
cial labeling can cause self-hatred in children of color).
89. See VAN AUSDALE & FEAGIN, supra note 78, at 97-98.
90. See, e.g., James S. Leonard & Thomas A. Tenney, Introduction: The Contro-
versy Over Huckleberry Finn, in SATIRE OR EVASION?, supra note 63, at 9.
91. See generally Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools:
The Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78
IOWA L. REV. 813, 856 (1993) (implying that Whites are worried about moral image).
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lowing an immoral law that made Jim property. How can that choice
be characterized as a moral dilemma, that is, as equally morally "un-
favorable?"
Finally, Black students repeatedly object to the book because of
the disrespect they feel when classes read it. For example, my daugh-
ter's reaction to the book and Twain's repeated use of the epithet is
quite telling about its potential impact on Black children. She said
the book is racist because Twain makes Jim call himself by the word.
"This means to me that Twain is saying that Blacks have no heart,
no dignity, no soul." This is a profound expression of one eleven-year-
old's reaction to the book. Consider the reaction of an African Ameri-
can at least one, possibly two generations older than my daughter.
When her eighth grade class read the book, Toni Morrison said it
"'provoked a feeling I can only describe now as muffled rage, as
though appreciation of the work required my complicity in and sanc-
tion of something shaming."'9
If it is acceptable to expose Black students to the novel even
though it hurts them as they say it does, then teachers are instruct-
ing all of the students that it is acceptable to show disrespect for
Blacks because Blacks do not deserve to be respected. This is emo-
tional segregation. Moreover, some students, regardless of race, may
internalize the message of Whites' disrespect for Blacks. For Black
students, it takes enormous self-esteem to resist being identified as
inferior, someone who deserves no respect, but it takes no thought for
Whites to absorb and internalize the message of superiority,93 which
results in puffing up their self-esteem at the cost of denying Blacks'
humanity. In this way, Carla's three-year-old nursery school identifi-
cation of Blacks as n s does not get "unlearned;" it gets reinforced
when she is a teenager in middle-school reading The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn as part of a mandatory curriculum. "
Moreover, the lesson of the validity of the race precept is even
more pernicious in Huck Finn because children also are taught that
Huck and Jim eventually learn to love each other. But true love can-
not exist in a relationship built on disrespect and premised on an
inequality precept, because individuals whose partners believe one of
them is superior to the other either lack self-love if they are the tar-
92. MENSH & MENSH, supra note 62, at 109 (quoting Toni Morrison, Introduction
to HUCKLEBERRY FINN, supra note 61, at xxxi). Morrison also discovered in her second
reading of the novel "riveting episodes of flight, of cunning," and "convincing commen-
tary of adult behavior." Id.
93. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 969 (1993) (im-
plying that Whites are unaware of their own race and the privileges associated with
Whiteness).
94. VAN AUSDALE & FEAGIN, supra note 78.
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geted "inferior" partner, or they lack authenticity if they are the tar-
geted "superior" partner. A major consequence of engaging children
in an exercise that strips Black children of their hearts, their dignity
and their souls is to reinforce the racial precept even if teachers do
not consciously intend this result. Whites of goodwill who truly want
to achieve racial equality must understand the ways in which chil-
dren are taught the validity of the race precept because racial equal-
ity cannot be achieved as long as children are asked by teachers to
engage in exercises that racialize people and identify them as supe-
rior or inferior depending on where they fall in the hierarchy.
In this way, White society's interpretation of Huck and Jim's re-
lationship as loving when it is not, provides evidence of the problems
Greene, Ross, Feagin, Lopez, and Schutte explore in their papers
about perpetuating negative stereotypes of minority groups. For ex-
ample, Feagin and Lopez similarly describe the negative stereotyping
of marginalized people of color by racially dominant groups as intel-
lectually, socially, and culturally inferior human beings.95 Perhaps
Justice Harlan would disagree but he probably would not be sur-
prised. Similarly, Greene and Ross describe heterosexual society's
negative stereotyping of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and people of color
as sexually promiscuous individuals who therefore are incapable of
having loving relationships? Perhaps even Twain would appreciate
the irony: Huck can disrespect and dehumanize Jim in many ways
and that is defined by Whites not as cruelty, but as love. Similarly,
the gay relationship built on mutual respect, empathy, trust and
other affirming emotions is defined by heterosexuals not as love, but
as promiscuity. 7 All the while, America holds itself out as a democ-
ratic nation that supports equality of all people. America's definition
of equality for minorities, however, is like Huck's definition of love for
Jim; both are defined and manipulated to sustain Huck's power over
Jim, Whites' power over people of color, and heterosexuals' power
over gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.
Fortunately, some students are able to exert their agency and ac-
tively resist the inferiority/superiority message in Huck Finn. My
daughter did not accept Twain's message about her racial inferiority
to Huck and correctly identified the novel as racist because it tried to
strip Blacks of their hearts, their dignities, and their souls. Parents
often are and should be the best buffers against their children's in-
doctrination in inequality precepts. Consider this conversation be-
tween Mungu and his mother:
"I feel that Jim is not a human being,"... adding that Jim was
95. See Feagin, supra note 5, at 961; Lopez, supra note 5, at 993-94.
96. See Greene, supra note 5, at 952-56; Ross, supra note 5, at 1006-09.
97. See Greene, supra note 5, at 954-56.
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there only to serve whites. At his mother's suggestion, Mungu took
the matter up with his teacher, who replied that "a lot of Blacks
were not intelligent at the time the book was written, and they
were too ignorant to understand how they were being treated."
Mungu answered: "Blacks were powerless, not unintelligent.
'
"
98
Mungu's mother's lesson to her son was about rejecting the race
precept and embracing his fundamental identity as an African
American. Lopez suggests that indigenous people also resist being
defined as Mestizo and hold on to their fundamental identities as a
distinct and unique culture.99 Resistance of imposed identities is eas-
ier if one has safe-places to retreat from dominant cultures - places
where one is loved for who one is.
Conversely, imagine situations where the "inferiority" group
member's identity is not supported by his or her family. In situations
where parents believe in an inequality precept relevant to their chil-
dren's identities, the parents contribute to the indoctrination of their
children in the validity of that precept. This creates a greater possi-
bility for self-doubt or self-hatred. Specifically, when a child's identity
differs from the parents', it can result in alienation from the family,
perhaps because the family feels a need to escape the stigma that at-
taches to having a "different" and "inferior" child. In the context of
sexual orientation, Greene suggests that some families try to incor-
porate the "different" child into the family in a way that both denies
the child's "difference" and simultaneously "accepts" the child.' She
exemplifies this in the context of African American culture in which
strong "girlfriend" relationships are valued.'0 ' It is possible for a les-
bian couple to fit within the "girlfriend" paradigm of the culture
without being identified as lovers.' In this way, families and cul-
tures may treat "others" respectfully but not feel respect for them.
Parents who deny or denounce their children's fundamental
identities as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or as the partners of someone of a
different race, teach their children self-disrespect and self-rejection.
Their relationships are like Huck and Jim's: purportedly loving but
full of disrespect. 3 Parents, even though not state actors, can create
emotional segregation in the private realm, which then gets rein-
forced by state actors in the public realm. Even if parents or domi-
nant cultures treat "others" with basic respect as would be expected
in a society where civility is valued, attempts to change someone's
identity to conform to dominant norms is strong evidence of the
98. MENSH & MENSH, supra note 62, at 108.
99. See Lopez, supra note 5, at 997-98.
100. See Greene, supra note 5, at 938.
101. Id.
102. See Ross, supra note 5, at 1002-04.
103. See generally Rush, Huck Finn, supra note 64.
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dominant culture's internalized disrespect of the individual. More-
over, unless the dominant culture feels that "others" are entitled to
respect in the fullest sense of the word, that is, they are entitled to
self-identify, the dominant culture will be unmoved to eliminate ine-
quality precepts. This is what Harlan implied would happen in the
context of race.
10 4
If Whites felt that people of color deserved to be treated equally,
Whites would do something to achieve that goal. In the context of
Huck Finn, the book could be taken out of mandatory curricula of in-
tellectually and emotionally immature students. It could be made
available in libraries for students to check out on a voluntary basis.
Perhaps most significantly, it could be relegated to an anticanon of
American literature much the way cases like Dred Scott'° and Plessy
v. Ferguson have been relegated to the anticanon of constitutional
law.' The message is similar: a society of diverse people who believe
in equality for all people, reject the once canonical texts that no
longer reflect the normative values of the society."7 Huck Finn,
Plessy v. Ferguson, and Dred Scott can be studied as anticanonical
texts in appropriate settings because they can be valuable materials
for understanding why and how society once valued them in ways
they no longer do.
SUMMARY
Emotional segregation is a subset of de terminate segregation. It
is a form of racial segregation that is legally sanctioned disrespect of
racial minorities that perpetuates racial inequality. I have tried to
show how The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn creates emotional seg-
regation in classrooms. Perhaps the greatest irony in the debate
whether the novel should be part of public school curricula is cap-
tured by Kenny Williams, an African American scholar: "Ultimately,
the status of Huckleberry Finn as a 'classic' may tell more about the
nation than many Americans want to know."' Perhaps Professor
Williams is right. It is increasingly easier to exclude children from
the equality circle because equality currently is about process and
104. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557, 560-64 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissent-
ing).
105. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
106. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 963, 1019 (1998) (discussing American Constitutional Canon); see gen-
erally Richard A. Primus, Essay: Canon, Anti-canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE
L.J. 243, 245 (1998) (citing Balkin & Levinson, supra).
107. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 106, at 1019.
108. Kenny J. Williams, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn; or, Mark Twain's Racial
Ambiguity, in SATIRE OR EVASION?, supra note 63, at 237.
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not about substantive results.9 I have focused on racial emotional
segregation because this is my interest, but others are invited to join
this discussion to help flush out either or both of the concepts of de
terminate or emotional segregation. One thing is certain: As long as
society sanctions the disrespect of people in ways that violate democ-
ratic principles - like equality - then segregation in myriad forms will
persist as Greene, Ross, Feagin, Lopez, and Schutte highlight."'
Once a young child is taught that he or she is inferior to a domi-
nant group because of race, sexual orientation, religion, gender or
any other identity trait that "other-izes" the child, then the dominant
paradigm becomes even more entrenched. It is exceedingly difficult
for individuals who are programmed into believing they are inferior
to reclaim their self-identities. Equally significant, such program-
ming also makes it difficult for individuals who are taught to believe
in their superiority to "others" to claim their self-identities as authen-
tic human beings. In this way, all children have identities imposed on
them from young ages.
Mindful of Schutte's admonition to respect the right to self-
determination, it nevertheless seems an unavoidable conclusion that
equality can only be achieved if individuals' rights to self-identify are
embraced as a principle of universal human rights.' An individual's
freedom to self-identify, in contradistinction to being identified by the
dominant culture, depends on teaching children both to reject estab-
lished hierarchies that support inequality precepts, particularly
those of Western-dominant influence, and to accept universal princi-
ples of humanity articulated in many U.N. declarations. Schutte cor-
rectly emphasizes the importance in the struggle for equality of all
people to abide by international human rights principles, including
principles of autonomy and self-determination."' This is an intrinsic
part of internationally accepted understandings of human equality."'
Admittedly, while assimilation correctly is eschewed by minority
groups, as all of the authors highlight,"4 children nevertheless must
109. Cf Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew A Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimila-
tion, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REV. 581,
611-13 (1993) (claiming that children are not indoctrinated when exposed to different
beliefs in the classroom).
110. See generally Feagin, supra note 5; Greene, supra note 5; Lopez, supra note 5;
Ross, supra note 5; Schutte, supra note 5.
111. Cf Schutte, supra note 5, at 1026-27.
112. See id.
113. See Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Out of the Shadows: Traversing the
Imaginary of Sameness, Difference, and Relationalism - a Human Rights Proposal, 17
WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 111, 135 (2002) (stating that equality is a "universally accepted
principle").
114. See generally Feagin, supra note 5; Greene, supra note 5; Lopez, supra note 5;
Ross, supra note 5; Schutte, supra note 5.
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be indoctrinated in the principle that self-identity matters for minori-
ties and that who they are fundamentally should be legally respected
and protected.115
115. Stolzenberg, supra note 109, at 655-56 (identifying the paradox of a liberal
education).
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